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A Conservative Court Says "Goodbye to All That"' and
Forges a New Order in the Law of Seizure- California v.
Hodari D.
I. INTRODUCTION
Harsky and Stutch are two famous police officers who have chosen
to cruise the steamy streets of downtown "Mall City," a neighborhood
well-known as a high-crime area. While cruising in their marked police
car, they notice a group of men standing on a dimly lit street corner.
Stutch's eyes narrow as he recognizes the visage of one Bernhard, a
person Stutch remembers arresting on a previous weapons charge. The
rumor on the street is that Bernhard has branched into selling stolen
pistols to passers-by. Harsky decides to see if this rumor is correct, so
he tells Stutch, "Let's turn on the lights, roar up on them, and see
what happens-maybe they'll panic and do something stupid." Stutch
signals his assent by doing exactly what Harsky wants, and they come
to a screeching halt in front of Bernhard and his cohorts.
Bernhard and his cohorts, fearing arrest, break and run. Stutch
pursues on foot, and fires ahead of Bernhard, yelling at him to halt.
Bernhard hears the gunfire and becomes so afraid that he throws away
the pistols that he had been selling. Stutch sees the pistols, and tackles
Bernhard. The arrest report will read that Stutch saw the suspect discard
the pistols, for which Stutch arrested him. Bernhard's attorney will claim
that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurred when the police
sped down the street and screeched to a halt in front of him, com-
municating that he was not free to leave. Bernhard's attorney will also
claim that the police actions before the pistols' production were exces-
sively overbearing and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, since
Harsky and Stutch lacked any reason to bear down on Bernhard in the
first place. The attorney believes that it is a foregone conclusion that
the evidence will be excluded as resulting from a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. However, he may be surprised to know that a recent United
States Supreme Court case, California v. Hodari D., may have rendered
not only his reasoning incorrect, but also the reasoning of over a decade
of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
I. With apologies to Robert Graves, author of, among other works, I, Claudius,
and an autobiography whose title I "borrowed."
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The importance of making a determination of when the seizure
occurs cannot be underestimated. There must be some point at which
the Fourth Amendment and its protection against "unreasonable" police
intrusions come into play. If the police action is not seen as a seizure,
then the police conduct will not come under Fourth Amendment "rea-
sonableness" scrutiny. If a suspect is not viewed as being "seized,"
then there is no check on police behavior because, until the point of
seizure, the police conduct is not considered for exclusionary purposes.
Thus, police conduct is not susceptible to reasonableness review until
the point that a seizure is deemed to have occurred.
Determining the moment of seizure is particularly critical when
speaking of evidence abandoned by the defendant and whether it should
be excluded. The Supreme Court of Louisiana explained the reason why
courts should pay close attention to the moment of seizure:
When police officers make [a seizure] without the legal right to
do so, property abandoned or otherwise disposed of as a result
thereof cannot be legally seized. If, however, property is aban-
doned without any prior unlawful intrusion into a citizen's right
to be free from government interference, then such property
may be lawfully seized. In such cases, there is no expectation
of privacy and thus no violation of a person's custodial rights.
It is only when the citizen is actually [seized] without reasonable
cause . . . that the "right to be let alone" is violated, thereby
rendering unlawful any resultant seizure of abandoned property.'
The purpose of this casenote is to briefly explain the state of the
law of seizure before Hodari D., how the decision changes the law, and
how this change will be received in Louisiana. The note's emphasis will
be on determining when a seizure occurs so that the Fourth Amendment
and its corresponding "reasonableness" will serve to review the conduct
of the seizing police. This note will also attempt to point out and remind
the reader of some relevant factors that should be considered in arriving
at the decision of when a seizure occurs. Possible alternatives as to how
the decision should be made, as well as arguments that the jurisprudence
before Hodari D. was much more flexible, reasonable, and precedent-
minded than the new decision will also be set forth. Finally, this note
will endeavor to predict which course Louisiana will take in determination
of police conduct as a seizure. However, before any discussion of Hodari
D. is warranted, the background to that decision must be laid out. In
this case, the background that must be constructed is the state of seizure
law when Hodari D. was handed down.
2. State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. 1983) (emphasis added).
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II. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS FOR SEIZURE BEFORE HoDAtI D.
A. Seizures and Exclusionary Policy Generally
The starting point for any discussion about the constitutionality of
law enforcement seizures is, of course, the Fourth Amendment and its
means of enforcement, the exclusionary rule.' The Fourth Amendment
provides, in pertinent part, that the "people" have a "right" to be
"secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable ... seizures." '4 The
penalty for any such "unreasonable" seizure is the exclusion of any
evidence which results from the "unreasonable seizure" and which is
offered as evidence in courts "charged at all times with the support of
the Constitution." ' This is so because "[tlo sanction [an unlawful seizure
by admitting the evidence] would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such ...
action." ' 6 Under this rule, a police officer is assumed to be less likely
to violate constitutional rights if it is apparent to the officer that the
fruits of such violations will be denied him in a subsequent prosecution.
This rule has, as its "major thrust," 7 the goal of "deterrence" ' of
odious law enforcement practices. This standard of review and its cor-
responding threat of exclusion are not present in all citizen/police en-
counters; they only appear in the encounters labeled "seizures." The
3. The exclusionary'rule is a jurisprudentially-created means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment in response to concerns that "if [evidence] can thus be [unconstitutionally]
seized and .. . used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection
of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344
(1914). The rule simply prevents the use of any evidence obtained through unconstitutional
means, and reflects the view of courts that the end (punishment of the guilty) does not
justify the means (violating the Constitution). For a good discussion of the exclusionary
rule and some of its underlying policies, see Jean Paul Layrisson, Comment, The Exclusion
of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence and Why the Louisiana Supreme Court Should
Reject United States v. Leon on Independent State Grounds, 51 La. L. Rev. 861 (1991).
4. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392, 34 S. Ct. at 344.
6. Id. at 394, 34 S. Ct. at 345.
7. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 12, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1968), citing Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961):
Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging
lawless police conduct. . . .Thus its major thrust is a deterrent one, . . . and
experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct
in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere "form of words."
8. 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. at 1875 (1968).
19921 1323
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
problem at this point is to determine when one of these encounters
becomes a seizure and, thus, falls under the aegis of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
B. When an Encounter Becomes a Seizure- The Importance of
Being Able to Walk A way
All seizures must be "tested by the Fourth Amendment general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." 9 However, if
police interaction with a person is not a seizure, it naturally follows
that the Fourth Amendment and its corollary rule of exclusion do not
apply."0 The Court best asserted this oft-mentioned proposition in Florida
v. Royer:"
[Liaw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment
by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another
public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some
questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing
to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution
his voluntary answers to such questions .... [the suspect] may
not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective
grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does
not, without more, furnish those grounds. 2
As the Court noted, the person so approached is not required to answer
any questions posed to him by police and can continue to proceed about
9. Id. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
10. As Professor LaFave says in 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on
the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(h), at 402 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis added):
[lIf the police come onto incriminating evidence during a street encounter but
are unable to show that they had even the lesser quantum of evidence needed
to justify a Terry-type stop [reasonable and articulabW basis of suspicion, with
the stop being of a limited nature so as to confirm or dispel the suspicion),
that evidence will nonetheless be admissible if it is determined that as of the
time of that discovery no seizure had yet occurred.
This observation shows the importance of determining exactly when a seizure occurs for
exclusionary purposes.
The Supreme Court summed it up in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, 80
S. Ct. 168, 171 (1959), in which federal agents investigating stolen whiskey claims observed
cartons being placed in defendant's car, followed, and stopped the car. In holding that
the officers' stop of the car was without probable cause and any fruits seized were to
be excluded as illegally obtained evidence, the Court said that:
It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether at or before [the time of seizure
the policel had reasonable cause to believe that a crime had been committed.
The fact that afterwards contraband was discovered is not enough. An arrest
is not justified by what the subsequent search discloses ....
II. 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983).
12. Id., citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2255
n.12 (1979) (emphasis added).
1324 [Vol. 52
NOTES
his business without fear of police interference. 3 The police actions
become a seizure only "when the officer, by means of physical force
or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen."' 4 Professor LaFave states that a confrontation is a seizure "only
if the officer adds to those inherent pressures [brought on by police/
citizen interaction] by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that
accepted in social intercourse.""
According to Professor LaFave, such socially unacceptable law en-
forcement conduct would "include such tactics as pursuing a person
who has attempted to terminate the contact by departing."' 6 The Supreme
Court has noted the importance of protecting an individual's right to
terminate these encounters by departure. In Brown v. Texas, 7 two
officers attempted to stop the defendant in an area known for frequent
drug transactions; when the officers attempted to question him, the
defendant vehemently refused to give the officers any information other
than that the officers had no right to detain and question him.' He
was subsequently arrested for violating a statute that required him to
identify himself to an officer who had lawfully. stopped him.' 9 The Court
held that the defendant was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment when the officers had, without reason to suspect Brown of any
malfeasance, held him so he could identify himself after he had expressed
a desire not to.20 Thus, the Court found that the police officer did not
seize Brown when he asked him to identify himself and his .reasons for
being there, but rather when the officer did not allow him to leave
without answering.
The importance of this decision is its determination that a seizure
occurred when the defendant was not allowed to exercise his right to
refuse to answer questions and leave. This refusal by police to ac-
knowledge the right of a defendant to leave was apparently the beginning
point of the seizure in Brown. Although the Court did not discuss this,
it would appear that i? was not the physical restraint of Brown that
made the seizure, but rather Brown's reasonable realization that the
police were not going to recognize his right to depart. Later that year,
13. Id., citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1885-86 (1968).
14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16 (1968).
15. LaFave, supra note 10, § 9.2(h), at 412.
16. Id. at 413.
17. 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979).
18. Id. at 49, 99 S. Ct. at 2639.
19. Id. at 49 n.I, 99 S. Ct. at 2639 n.1.
20. Id. at 52, 99 S. Ct. at 2641 (emphasis added). Also see INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984), where the Court emphasized this principle
as follows: "llinterrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by
the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure."
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the Court would come out and actually give its opinion as to when a
seizure occurred and, by so doing, determine when the Fourth Amend-
ment concept of reasonableness applied to police actions.
C. The Mendenhall Test of "Objective Intimidation"
Later in the same term that produced Brown, the Court finally
came to grips with the problem of when a seizure occurred. In United
States v. Mendenhall,2 the defendant, who fit a drug courier profile,
was stopped at an airport by federal agents who asked her to produce
her identification and her ticket.2 When the names on both documents
did not match, the federal agents asked the defendant to accompany
them to the airport Drug Enforcement Agency office for questioning. 3
She accompanied them without protest and consented to a search that
yielded narcotics.24 The defendant claimed that she had been "seized"
when the agents initially approached her and began their interrogation,
and because such seizure had been without the "reasonable suspicion"
required in order to seize, the fruits of such unconstitutional seizure
should be excluded at trial. 5 The Court, rejecting Mendenhall's argu-
ment, held that there was no seizure when the agents initially approached
and interrogated the defendant:
[A) person is "seized" only when, by means of physical force
or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.
Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation
whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. . . . As long as
the person to whom the questions are put remains free to
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no in-
trusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under
the constitution require some particularized and objective jus-
tification. 6
21. 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
22. Id. at 547-48, 100 S. Ct. at 1873.
23, Id. at 548, 100 S. Ct. at 1874.
24. Id., 100 S.Ct. at 1874.
25. Id. at 549-50, 100 S. Ct. at 1874-75. The minority opinion, authored by Justice
White, gave an idea of what the grounds of a permissible stop were, citing Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979):
[W]e have recognized that in some circumstances an officer may detain a suspect
briefly for questioning although he does not have "probable cause" to believe
that the suspect is involved in criminal activity, as is required for a traditional
arrest. However, we have required the officers to have a reasonable suspicion,
based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.
446 U.S. at 567, 100 S. Ct. at 1884.
26. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)
(emphasis added).
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The Mendenhall Court then gave what many perceive to be the test for
a seizure:
We conclude that a person has been seized within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of cir-
cumstances that might indicate a seizure ... would be the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.27
The Court set out a standard focusing on the state of mind of a suspect
which can be summed up as follows: Would the average, reasonable
man believe that he would be forcefully detained if he attempted to
leave? If that average, reasonable person did believe that under the
circumstances he could not leave, he was therefore "seized" under the
Fourth Amendment.
By applying the Mendenhall test to the introductory "Harsky and
Stutch" hypothetical, a reader can see that Bernhard was seized when
Harsky and Stutch's actions communicated to him that he was not free
to leave. The actions that communicated that he was not free to leave
were the sudden and screeching halt of the police car and the subsequent
chase. The Court would go on to apply and refine this test in a series
of cases following Mendenhall.
1. Application of Mendenhall
a. Royer and Delgado
The Court applied the Mendenhall standard to a similar set of
circumstances in Florida v. Royer, '2 in which the defendant Royer, who
matched a drug courier profile, was approached by detectives who
demanded his identification and driver's license.29 The detectives did not
return Royer's license and airline ticket, asked him to go with them to
a room away from the concourse, and, "without Royer's consent or
agreement," retrieved his luggage using his claim check.30 Royer only
unlocked his suitcase, but the detective opened it without "further assent
from Royer."'" Marijuana was found and Royer challenged its intro-
27. Id. at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877 (emphasis added).
28. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
29. Id. at 493-94, 103 S. Ct. at 1322.
30. 1788 Id. at 494, 103 S. Ct. at 1322.
31. Id., 103 S.Ct. at 1322.
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duction in court, claiming it was the fruit of a seizure which occurred
without any constitutional basis when the agents communicated that
Royer was not free to leave by taking his identification, tickets, and
luggage.3 2 Royer asserted that the agents had not had the requisite
probable cause to seize him when they took his tickets and luggage and
removed him to an isolated room, thus tainting any evidence that the
state received as a result of this seizure." The Court, applying the
Mendenhall test, recognized that the seizure occurred when the officers,
by taking Royer's identification, ticket, and luggage, caused "any con-
sensual aspects of the encounter [to] evaporate. '3 4 The Court noted that
the "primary interest" of the detectives was not merely to ask questions
and have "an extended conversation" with Royer if he so chose, but
rather to determine the contents of his luggage." Underlying the decision
was the intimidating nature of the police conduct, and its logical effect
on the defendant's actions (i.e., unlocking the suitcase). By excluding
the evidence, the Court sent out an implicit message that the police
would not be allowed to benefit from the intimidating circumstances of
a seizure unless the seizure was supported by either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, depending upon the nature and duration of the
seizure.
The Court continued to apply this intimidation standard in later
cases. In INS v. Delgado3 6 Immigration and Naturalization Service
agents went into a factory for a purported survey of employees. The
agents blocked the exits and went through the factory asking employees
several questions regarding their citizenship.37 During the survey, the
employees were allowed to wander around the factory, but not to go
outside."t After this survey, four of the surveyed employees filed suit
questioning the constitutionality of the survey, and requesting declaratory
32. Id. at 496, 103 S. Ct. at 1323.
33. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 496, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1323 (1983). Since the
police activity in removing and isolating Royer constituted something more than an
investigatory stop, the Court cited Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248
(1979), for the proposition that "a police confinement which ... goes beyond the limited
restraint of an] investigatory stop may be constitutionally justified only by probable
cause." Since the marijuana, was obtained by (debatably) a free act of will (the consensual
search of the suitcase) that would have never occurred but for the detention, the next
inquiry is whether the evidence was obtained as a result of the illegal detention. The
merits of such an inquiry are beyond the scope of this article, but the nature of the
inquiry is best illustrated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407
(1963).
34. 460 U.S. at 503, 103 S.Ct. at 1327.
35. Id. at 505, 103 S. Ct. at 1328.
36. $888 466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
37. Id. at 212, 104 S. Ct. at 1760.
38. Id. at 213, 104 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
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and injunctive relief.3 9 The Court held that the employees were not seized
since they could not have left the factory anyway since their jobs required
their presence. 40 As for any intimidation-based claims of seizure, the
Court said the workers had "no reasonable fear that they would be
seized or detained in any meaningful way" since "the mere possibility
that they would be questioned if they sought to leave" was not intim-
idation enough. 41 In dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out rather prac-
tically that the actions of the INS agents (blocking the exits and combing
the factory) constituted a "show of authority" which was "of sufficient
size and force to overbear the will of any reasonable person."42 This
overbearance of the will would make anyone feel compelled to stop and
answer any questions, and, thus, he would be seized under the Brown
v. Texas rationale, supra. The Court agreed with the basis of Brennan's
dissenting argument, the Mendenhall test, saying that:
Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating
as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed
he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot
say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth
Amendment. But if the persons [sic] refuses to answer and the
police take additional steps-such as those taken in Brown-to
obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes some
minimal level of objective justification to validate the detention
or seizure.' 3
The Court's disagreement with Justice Brennan came not from his use
of the Mendenhall test, but from the results he received based on it.
Although Delgado and Royer have different results as to whether or
not seizures occurred, the different results stem from how the Mendenhall
test is applied and not whether or not it should be applied. Both cases'
use of the Mendenhall standard seems to prove that each case recognized
the test as valid.
b. Chesternut
The Court had a more recent opportunity to apply the Mendenhall
test in Michigan v. Chesternut," in which the defendant, seeing a marked
police car, turned and ran; the car caught up to him and followed for
a short distance .4 As the policemen drove beside the defendant, they
39. Id., 104 S.Ct. at 1760-61.
40. Id. at 219. 104 S. Ct. at 1764.
41. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 219, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (1984).
42. Id. at 229, 104 S. Ct. at 1769.
43. Id. at 216-17, 104 S. Ct. at 1763.
44. 486 U.S. 567, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988).
45. Id. at 569, 108 S. Ct. at 1977.
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saw him toss away some packets he removed from his pocket.46 The
police car stopped, and an officer examined the bags, determining that
they held pills. 47 The defendant stopped, and was arrested when the
officers determined that the pills had codeine as an ingredient. The
defendant claimed he had been seized under the Fourth Amendment
when the car began following him, thus communicating to him that he
was not free to leave."8 Thus, because the action of the police in following
Chesternut was a seizure, it required at least some constitutional grounds,
such as reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Since the facts that were
known to the officers at the time of the alleged seizure were insufficient
to pass Fourth Amendment reasonableness muster, the seizure was not
constitutional and any evidence found as a result would be excluded. 49
The Court refused to hold that all chases are per se seizures and
instead relied on the Mendenhall test to evaluate each chase on a case-
by-case basis.50 The Court pointed out that the car's following of the
defendant "would not have communicated to the reasonable person an
attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon [a person's] freedom of
movement," and, since this was the extent of the police activity, de-
fendant was not seized at the time he abandoned the evidence.,' Since
there was no seizure requiring constitutional justification, the evidence
was abandoned by defendant and therefore admissible. Thus, according
to Chesternut, if police actions in following a suspect do not reasonably
communicate to him that he is about to become the subject of an
"attempt to capture," he is not seized under the Fourth Amendment,
and his choice to abandon evidence is independent of any law enforce-
ment activity.
The Court did provide a list of some things it would consider
indicative of a seizure, such as a command to halt or motion "in an
aggressive manner to block [a suspect's] course or otherwise control the
direction or speed of his movement." 52 Most of the these things were
46. Id., 108 S.Ct. at 1977.
47. Id., 108 S.Ct. at 1977.
48. Id. at 571, 108 S. Ct. at 1977.
49.. In California v. Hodari D., III S. Ct. 1547, 1549 n.1 (1991), the majority makes
an allusion that the flight of a suspect from a police officer could be enough in itself
to support reasonable suspicion and allow for a seizure of some extent.
50. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988). In
footnote 9, the Court clearly refused to decide at that time if police pursuit "will amount
to a stop from the outset or from an early point in the chase, if the police command
the person to halt'and indicate that he is not free to go." The Court implied that it
would not decide if all chases were seizures, but it did decide if this "chase" amounted
to a seizure.
51. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 1980.
52. Id., 108 S:Ct. at 1980.
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present in Hodari D., and what is fascinating is that the Court completely
disregarded its own list in formulating its decision.
These cases and the Mendenhall test they embraced comprised the
state of the law at the time of the decision of California v. Hodari
D. 13 In summation, they held that a seizure occurred when law enforce-
ment conduct was of such an overbearing type as to communicate to
a reasonable person that he was not free to disregard the presence of
the law enforcement actors and leave. Little did observers of the Court
know that this flexible, fact-specific standard's days were numbered
when writs were granted to Hodari D.
1I. THE CURIOUS CASE OF CALIFORNIA V. HODARI D.
A. The Facts and Background of the Case
Late on an April night of 1988, two plainclothes police officers
were on patrol in a "high-crime area" of Oakland, California. These
officers were wearing jackets emblazoned with "Police" on both the
front and back. As they rounded a street corner they saw some youths
grouped around a parked car, who upon seeing the officers' car, panicked
and fled. The now-suspicious officers gave chase, one in the car, and
one on foot. The officer on foot eventually found himself running head-
on into the defendant, one Hodari D. Seeing the policeman about to
tackle him, Hodari threw away a bag later found to contain crack
cocaine. Immediately afterwards, the officer caught up to the defendant,
tackled him, and placed him under arrest." At this point, it is critical
to note that the officers admittedly had no constitutional basis for their
pursuit of Hodari until he tossed the drugs." In his juvenile proceeding,
Hodari attempted to have the crack suppressed as the fruit of an illegal
seizure that occurred when the officers pursued him, but his motion
was denied.16 This ruling was reversed in an opinion by the California
Court of Appeal which held that "Hodari had been seized when he saw
[the policeman] running towards him, that this seizure was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence of cocaine had to
53. II1 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
54. Id. at 1549. It is assumed that the police officer had already decided to tackle
Hodari before he saw the crack. Of course, it can always be argued that he merely was
running after the defendant to ask why he fled. However, under Mendenhall, such rapid
pursuit would communicate an intent to seize.
55. The State of California conceded that there had been no probable cause for the
chase, and the Court did not disturb this concession in the majority opinion itself, instead
choosing to question this concession in a footnote, which will be discussed at infra note
59.
56. I1 S. Ct. at 1549.
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be suppressed as the fruit of that illegal seizure.""7 Although the state's
application for review was denied by the California Supreme Court, a
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was requested
and granted."8
B. The Opinion
1. The Court Makes a Surprise Move
It seemed that the United States Supreme Court would follow the
framework of the California court and present the issue as one that
involved exactly when the seizure occurred. If the seizure was found to
have occurred when Hodari saw the police officer chasing him without
any constitutional basis, then the crack thrown by Hodari in response
should therefore be excluded as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. On
the other hand, if the seizure occurred when the officer tackled Hodari
and after Hodari had obviously abandoned an illegal drug, then the
seizure was with at least reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause,
and the evidence would be admissible. Rather than approaching the case
in the traditional Mendenhall-based way, Justice Scalia took a whole
different tack and threw the customary legal concepts of seizure to the
wind. 9 Instead of following the framework of the California court and
57. 265 Cal. Rptr. 79 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1989).
58. 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
59. In a rather foreboding note in California v. Hodari D., III S. Ct. 1547, 1549
(1991), Justice Scalia contended that it "contradicts proverbial common sense" to hold
that it would be "unreasonable to stop ... young men who scatter in panic upon the
mere sighting of the police," citing as his source Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee when
no man pursueth."). This is nothing new for Scalia, who, in Michigan v. Chesternut.
486 U.S. 567, 574, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1988), sided with Kennedy's concurrence that
"respondent's unprovoked flight gave police ample cause to stop him." Justice Scalia
obviously disagrees with holdings like Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979),
which emphasize a person's right to avoid police encounters unless the police have
reasonable suspicion to force the encounter. Scalia is perfectly willing to decide that flight
from police is enough, given the circumstances of vicinity and time of the transaction,
to justify police pursuit and seizure, whether it occurs (under the Mendenhall test) at the
initiation of the pursuit, or when it occurs (under his new test) when force is applied or
there is submission to authority.
Scalia is not alone in his views on unprovoked flight as cause enough for a seizure.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana said in State v. Belton, 441 So.. 2d 1195, 1199 (La.
1983), that "ifIlight from ... approaching officers, coupled with the other facts and
circumstances known by the officers, was sufficiently suspicious to justify [a seizure] based
on reasonable cause to believe defendant had committed, was committing, or was about
to commit a crime." In Belton, the other circumstances that, coupled with the flight,
justified the seizure were that defendant had previously had narcotics, he was standing
as though he had narcotics on him, and the location was in a similar "high crime area"
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its Mendenhall-based determinations of whether or not the police be-
havior was enough to convince a citizen that he was not free to leave,
Justice Scalia characterized the issue as a "narrow question" of "whether,
with respect to a show of authority as with respect *to application of
physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield";
the Court's answer to this query was "no."960
In holding that a seizure does not occur if the suspect does not
yield to police authority, i.e., stop running away, the Court pointed out
that a seizure "readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when ...
unsuccessful. '"61 The Court's seven-two majority was emphatic in its
statement that seizures do not "remotely apply .. .to the prospect of
a policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form
that continues to flee." 6 Thus, for there to be a seizure, the majority
concluded there must be either a "show of authority" resulting in
submission, or physical contact with the suspect. 63
Under the new test of Hodari D., the introductory Harsky and
Stutch hypothetical will have a different resolution. Under Hodari D.,
Bernhard was not seized until he was tackled by Stutch. Since Stutch
made the tackle after he saw the incriminating evidence, the seizure was
with probable cause. The seizure was born only at the moment of
touching or submission, i.e., cessation of movement, and only the events
immediately preceding this touching or submission are considered under
Hodari D. A court would not weigh any of the preceding events that
led up to the probable cause under Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry. A court's ignorance of hotly aggressive police actions (such as
screeching halts, foot pursuits, and gunfire) and subsequent concentration
on a suspect's actions as the trigger for the Fourth Amendment is
manifestly unjust.
2. The Injustice of Hodari D.
Justice Scalia and the majority in Hodari D. decided that the Fourth
Amendment-based threat of deterrence and its corresponding inquiry
as in Hodari D.
Finally, the use of the Bible as opposed to jurisprudence and legal theory for
precedential support in constitutional decision-making is another method that is not new
for Justice Scalia. In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799-800
(1988), Justice Scalia claimed that the right of confrontation stemmed from ancient sources,
citing Acts 25:16 for support of this belief. Although the Bible has great value as a tool
for moral and religious instruction, its efficacy and propriety for solving problems of
constitutional law is highly questionable.
60. Hodari D., I1I S. Ct. at 1550.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1551.
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into the reasonableness of police actions applied only to "genuine,
successful seizures."" What Scalia meant by an "unsuccessful seizure"
is one in which the suspect is neither touched nor submits to the police
presence by staying put. There is an element of unfairness in considering
only "successful seizures" as subject to the Fourth Amendment. Limiting
the application of deterrence to successful seizures that lack constitutional
basis is akin to only applying criminal penalties to successful crimes.
Such an application would be in defiance of the criminal law, which
punishes attempts to commit crimes, as well as their successful com-
pletion. For example, Louisiana has an attempt statute which punishes
a person who has the specific intent to commit a crime and "does an
act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment
of his object."16 Attempts, as the statute says, require an intent to
commit a proscribed act. Attempts also have the deterrent punishment
of jail time and possible fines.
An attempted violation of the Fourth Amendment should be handled
in much the same fashion as any attempt to do a proscribed act, since
a violation of the Fourth Amendment is certainly analogous to "mis-
conduct" by a police officer. The deterrence penalty can be compared
to a criminal penalty for the policeman who consciously engages in
conduct which reflects a disregard for the dictates of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Violations of the Fourth Amendment that merit the deterrent
punishment of exclusion require an intent to disregard the Fourth Amend-
ment. Criminal statutes rely on some form of intent, and their penalty
is, like evidentiary exclusion, a deterrent of sorts.
A failure to apply a penalty like exclusion to unsuccessful police
conduct (which is nevertheless undesirable) would be difficult to reconcile
philosophically. It would allow police to endeavor to do something that,
if it were successful, would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
For example, if the police officer in the introductory hypothetical caught
up to and tackled Bernhard before he abandoned the incriminating
evidence, he would have seized Bernhard without probable cause and
64. California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
65. La. R.S. 14:27(A) (1987) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an
act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his
object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be
immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accom-
plished his purpose.
66. Police are presumed to "know" the restraints of the Fourth Amendment in much
the same way a citizen is "presumed" to know the substantive criminal law. "Good
faith" errors in judgment of Fourth Amendment restraints should not be excused (with
respect to exclusionary policy). Of course, there are some dubious exceptions to this lack
of a "good faith" defense to violations of the Fourth Amendment, as in the case of
warrants (see Comment, supra note 3).
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the deterrent of exclusion would apply to any evidence that he found.
But now, the pursuit's reasonableness turns not on what the policeman
knew when he began the chase, but what he found out in the course
of the chase. The chase's validity relies now not on the suspect's previous
actions, but what he does in the course of the chase. Such a result
would condone aggressive police procedures in the hope of "shaking
up" evidence. It would also encourage police to pursue aggressively,
but not to catch the suspect in the hope that the suspect will discard
incriminating evidence.6" Such a result would be unjust and intolerable.
Unfortunately, however, injustice is not Hodari D.'s only flaw.
3. Inconsistencies With Past Decisions
Not only does the Hodari D. opinion appear to be unjust, but it
seems to be inconsistent, as well. The Hodari D. opinion is clearly
inconsistent with Chesternut, discussed supra, where the Court gave
examples of activity sufficient to constitute a "show of authority" under
which a reasonable person would believe that he was not "free to
leave." ' 6 This very activity was present in Hodari D. Further, Chesternut
had as its underlying premise the Mendenhall approach. Therefore, a
supporter of stare decisis would be heard to exclaim "What of Men-
denhall?" The Court had an answer for any stare decisis supporters
when it stated that the Mendenhall test of focusing on whether the
suspect has a reasonable belief that he is not free to leave merely "states
a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for seizure." 69 The Court
drew on the exact language of Mendenhall,70 claiming that the choice
of the words "a person has been seized only if. .. he believed he was
not free to leave" was a deliberate choice by the Mendenhall Court
over the words "whenever he believed he was not free to leave." 7' With
this, the Mendenhall test had been reduced to an analysis that merely
placed a certain set of circumstances in the "seizure ballpark." After
Hodari D., Mendenhall is perhaps only good for deciding when a show
of authority has occurred. However, the show of authority is no longer
enough in and of itself; there must be a visible effect of this show of
duthority, and the only acceptable effect appears to be a submission to
67. This pursuit would not have a very effective law enforcement value, since there
would always be the risk that the suspect will get away.
68. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 (1988).
69. California v. Hodari D., 1l S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
70. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980):
"[A] person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave." (emphasis added).
71. Hodari D., III S. Ct. at 1551.
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the authority. It is plain that this literalistic twisting of the words of
the Mendenhall decision turned the law of seizure on its ear.
4. The Erosion of Mendenhall
In response to the Court's literalist approach to reading a decision
that was quite clear on its face, it is obvious that the 1980 Court made
no such conscious choice in writing Mendenhall, and that its purpose
was to create a clear test which "allows the police to determine in
advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth
Amendment." 2 By making the Mendenhall test a sine qua non for
seizure, the Court in Hodari D. has effectively emasculated it as any
basis for determining conclusively whether or not a seizure has occurred.
One's reasonable belief that he is not free to leave is now a factor in
testing if a seizure occurs, not a test in and of itself. Basically, the
Cou-rt asserted that if Mendenhall was to be the test for determining
when a seizure had occurred, the Mendenhall Court would have said
so specifically. The fact that the Court used Mendenhall as the only
test for over ten years seemed irrelevant to the Hodari D. Court. 73
Further, by saying that a seizure only occurs when force is used or
submission occurs, the Court did not only weaken the Mendenhall test,
but threw it out altogether; if the birth of a seizure is now a brightline
test that only physical activity or submission to the threat of it can
satisfy, there is really no place for Mendenhall in future decisions. After
all, the suspect's invisible state of mind has no place in a brightline
test that only looks to the visible acts of either the police officer
(touching) or the suspect (submission).
The Court, in effect, threw out the concept that a show of authority
in itself constitutes a seizure, and seems to require "application of
physical force" to constitute a seizure.74 In doing this, the Court drew
on some "arcane knowledge of legal history" and compared the seizure
of a vessel as a war prize to the seizure of a person, claiming that a
person who has fled from the police is, while "still fleeing, even though
under attack, . . . not ... considered to have been seized."" s The "show
72. 486 U.S. at 572,'108 S. Ct. at 1980.
73. The Court says that in Chesternut, for example, even though the Mendenhall
test was used, it was not decided that, if the test was met, "a Fourth Amendment seizure
would have occurred." Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. at 1552. If the fact that a meeting of the
test's conditions was not equivalent to a seizure, then what was the purpose for the test's
use in that case? In 10 years' worth of decisions? This author cannot find a single case
dealing with seizures from Mendenhall to Chesternut in which the Mendenhall test was
not the basis of inquiry, and after its successful completion, a seizure was held not to
have occurred.
74. California v. Hodari D., III S. Ct. 1547. 1550 (1991).
75. Id. at 1549-50.
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of authority" constituting a seizure was now defined not as conduct
sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that he was about to
be detained regardless of whether he allowed the detention to occur or
not, but was instead surprisingly defined to mean a "show of authority"
that required an actual result of "submission" to the police officer. 6
Not only was this change in seizure law something of a surprise to
students of Fourth Amendment case law, but the change was almost
wholly without Supreme Court precedential support.
5. The Lack of Precedential Support for Hodari D.
The Court, in another surprising pronouncement, also refused to
"stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the mean-
ing of arrest" as defined in the common law. 7 This literal approach
went against the traditional approach of the Court, an approach noted
in Justice Stevens' vigorous dissent in Hodari D. Stevens argued that
the Court had repeatedly "endorsed" a broad reading of the Fourth
Amendment, 8 and, in light of this, such a requirement of actual physical
force for a Fourth Amendment seizure was unwarranted. 9 Stevens said
that the "test for a seizure (was] formulated by the Court in Men-
denhal," and the "Court's unwillingness ... to adhere to the 'rea-
sonable person' standard, as formulated by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall,
mark[ed] an unnecessary departure from Fourth Amendment case law." ' e
The Court used literal meaning to depart from prior case law and
as a tool to limit exclusionary policy, and, by doing so, ignored the
very words of one of its earlier decisions. Terry v. Ohio8 involved a
police officer (one McFadden) who observed some men apparently casing
a store for robbery.82 McFadden approached Terry, asked some ques-
tions, and, when McFadden received mumbling as an answer, spun Terry
76. Id. at 1551.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1554 (Stevens J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1554 (Stevens, J., dissenting) citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 476, 488, 48 S. Ct. 564, 571, 576 (1928):
Time and again, this Court in giving effect to the principle underlying the
Fourth Amendment, has refused to place an unduly literal construction upon
it (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
and
The direct operation or literal meaning of the words used do not measure the
purpose or scope of its provisions. Under the principles established and applied
by this Court, the Fourth Amendment safeguards against all evils that are like
and equivalent to those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words.
(Butler, J., dissenting).
80. I1 S.Ct. at 1557.
91. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
82. Id. at 5-6. 88 S. Ct. at 1871-72.
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around in order to frisk him for a weapon. A weapon was found, and
at trial Terry challenged the seizure and resulting search as unreasonable
since McFadden lacked probable cause to search him.13 The Court held
that even though Terry was not arrested, he was seized (but not saying
exactly when), and that the non-arrest seizure was reasonable. 4 The
Court realized that it had "broadened the range of encounters between
the police and the citizen encompassed within the term 'seizure"': 8 '
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs seizures
of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station
house and prosecution for a crime-"arrests" in traditional
terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has "seized" that person. 6
There is other language in Terry that goes against the Court's present
holding in Hodari D.:
"Search" and "seizure" are not talismans. We therefore reject
the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into
play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers
stop short of something called a "technical arrest" or a "full-
blown search."'"
These words and the subsequent decisions that relied upon them were
completely disregarded in the Court's holding in Hodari D. Instead of
looking to their own precedents in making a decision as to when the
seizure occurred in Hodari D., the Court forged a new order in deter-
mining when a seizure occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The only precedential support that the Court drew for its opinion
in Hodari D. was Brower v. County of Inyo.18 In Brower, an action
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the plaintiffs claimed that a police seizure
of excessive force resulted in the death of their son, said seizure con-
stituting a chase that ended in a collision with a police roadblock.89 The
Court decided, in another opinion written by Justice Scalia, that a seizure
occurs when "there is a governmental termination of freedom of move-
ment through means intentionally applied."' 9 The Court held that the
show of authority (flashing lights, chasing cars) was not enough, and
that there must have been actual physical action on the part of police
83. Id. at 6-8, 88 S. Ct. at 1872-73.
84. Id. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
85. California v. Hodari D., III S. Ct. 1547, 1555 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968).
87. Id. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
88. 489 U.S. 593, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989).
89. Id at 594, 109 S. Ct. at 1380.
90. Id. at 596, 109 S. Ct. at 1381.
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to have made the chase a seizure (such as sideswiping Brower's car into
the roadblock). 91 The Court dismissed the possibility that a seizure
occurred during the car chase because "that 'show of authority' did
not produce [the suspect's] stop." 92 The Court paid attention to the
roadblock itself as the means of seizure, ignoring the police chase of
Brower that led up to the collision. 93 By deciding Brower in this manner,
the Court essentially ignored any influence that the law enforcement
pursuit may have had on the suspect's actions that resulted in his death;
this disregard of the effect of law enforcement behavior would be
repeated in the Court's later opinion in Hodari D., where the Court
disregarded any influence that the police officer's pursuit may have had
on the defendant's so-called independent choice to abandon the contra-
band.
It is strange that the Court chose to bring up dicta in Brower to
support its point in Hodari D., considering that it decided that police
conduct was still responsible for his seizure. As Justice Stevens noted
in his dissent in Hodari D., "[tihe Court's opinion in Brower suggests
that the officer's responsibility should not depend on the character of
the victim's [response],"9 citing language from Brower to support his
point:
Brower's independent decision to continue the chase can no
more eliminate [police] responsibility for the termination of his
movement . . than Garner's independent decision to flee elim-
inated the Memphis police officer's responsibility for the ter-
mination of his movement effected by the bullet."
According to Brower, police still have to account for the effects of their
behavior and can still be responsible for a suspect's independent choices.
Stranger than the seemingly-flawed reliance on Brower was the Court's
revival of not only inapposite cases to support its holding, but of
relatively ancient ones, as well.
6. The Rebirth of Hester
Another odd thing to note in both Brower and Hodari D. are the
more-than-passing references to a rather old decision as support for the
Court's proposition of when a seizure occurs. Hester v. United States96
91. Id. at 596-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1381.
92. California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1560.
95. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1380 (1989).
For a lengthier discussion of Garner, see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
96. 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445 (1924).
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involved a case where an armed revenue agent pursued the defendant
after seeing him obtain containers thought to be filled with moonshine
whiskey. 9' During the flight, defendant jettisoned the containers, and
the agent recovered them. The Court held that no seizure of the bottles
had occurred, stating that "[t]he defendant's own acts ... disclosed
[the evidence] and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when
the officers examined the contents of each after it had been aban-
doned." 8 The Court in Brower pointed out that, for there to have been
an illegal seizure of the bottles, the agent would had to have asked for
the bottles with the defendant submitting to the authority-backed re-
quest. 99
What the Court failed to point out when it resuscitated Hester as
a "seizure of the person" case is one critical fact: Hester dealt with
the issue of abandoned objects and whether one had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an open field and did not deal with the issue
of what to do when an incriminating piece of evidence is abandoned
after heavy-handed law enforcement conduct. Mendenhall was decided
some fifty-five years later on that very issue. If Hester was the law on
police acquiring evidence through shows of authority, was it not implicitly
overruled in Mendenhall? If so, this author believes that a Court prudent
enough to choose words like "only if," instead of "whenever,"'10 in
sculpting opinions would have been careful enough to point out this
possible contradiction, and then endeavor to distinguish or dismiss it.
The Hodari D. Court's citings of both Brower and Hester seem to
forget the problem of the cause of the defendant's actions.
7. The Dilemma of Street Encounters
The Hodari D. Court wrestled with a fundamental tension in Fourth
Amendment law. The tension is between individual rights and effective
law enforcement. The police should continue to have a vested right to
approach a citizen and ask him questions without fear of invoking the
Fourth Amendment. Without the ability to do so, the police and the
public whom they protect would lose a valuable investigative tool. Imag-
ine the problems that would result if a police officer could not follow
his hunches and pursue (but not close with) a suspiciously fleeing in-
dividual; the police officer would have his hands tied if the individual
later gave him any evidence so as to support probable cause. The
policeman would not be able to react to the evidence and seize the
suspect: if the suspect was seized when the policeman followed him
97. Id. at 58, 44 S. Ct. at 446.
98. Id., 44 S.Ct. at 446.
99. 489 U.S. at 598, 109 S. Ct. at 1382.
100. See supra note 70.
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(without the visible or even subjective intent to seize), the policeman
seized the suspect without constitutional basis and any evidence would
have to be excluded so as to deter future similar police action.
On the other hand, a brightline rule saying that no matter what
threatening conduct the police committed, the individual, though intim-
idated, made his choices independently would be absurd as well as unfair.
It would protect the police actions that may have led to a so-called
independent choice from any Fourth Amendment inquiry. Such a rule
could lead to intolerable excesses. The threat of police excesses are the
very raison d'etre of the Fourth Amendment, and any test that would
allow for these excesses is contrary to the Fourth Amendment. In creating
such a test in Hodari D., the Court has forgotten this basic tenet and
assumes that police will never abuse their powers. Sad to say, common
sense tells society that this is not always the case, and giving law
enforcement officers such a powerful tool for overly-aggressive and
intrusive investigative procedures is simply too dangerous to contemplate.
This dilemma is not without solution, however.
8. Is There a Solution?
A more feasible approach to the dilemma of police effectiveness
versus individual rights would be as follows: police have the right to
approach casually and question; the citizen has the corresponding right
to ignore the questions and leave. If, however, in the course of the
approach, the suspect reacts and by so doing produces evidence and
the probable cause to seize, as in Hodari D., an inquiry by the Court
into the cause of the production is in order. A factor in this deter-
mination of cause should be the communicated intent of the approaching
officer. For any finding that the "legal cause"'' 1 of the defendant's
reaction was direct police action constituting a seizure, there should be
a communicated intent on the part of the officer not merely to approach,
ask, and hope for a reply, but to not allow the defendant to leave if
the reply is unsatisfactory. The socially unacceptable behaviors mentioned
by Professor LaFave, supra, would serve as a guide to determine if the
policeman had communicated the intent to seize. The Mendenhall test
took these factors into account, and, by so doing, made good sense.
The new test of Hodari D. does not, and it shows a marked inattention
to principles of causation and intent as factors in assigning responsibility.
The principal flaw in Hodari D. is the Court's removal of any approach
that analyzes cause and intent as factors in assigning responsibility for
evidence's appearance. By so doing, the Court has made a decision that
is legally unsound. It is legally unsound because it ignores basic principles
101. See infra section IV of text.
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of legal cause for events that consider not only factual matters, but
also certain policy considerations underlying the exclusionary rule. Of
course, the next step in this discussion is to set out and explain these
policies and what kind of test best protects them.
IV. LEGAL CAUSE IN DECIDING WHEN A SEIZURE HAS OCCURRED
A. Legal Cause In the Context of the Fourth Amendment
1. Legal Causation and Fourth Amendment Policy
a. "But-For" Causation
The majority in Hodari D. assumed that the defendant's discarding
of the bag of crack was a voluntary act evidencing the defendant's
relinquishment of his reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the
contents of the bag.102 What the Court ignored is the fact that "but
for" the actions of the police in cases like Hodari D. and Hester, the
evidence would never have been abandoned. After all, the defendants
did not have a sudden attack of conscience; had the threat of arrest
not appeared, the defendants would have retained contraband of some
monetary value. In failing to accept this "broad sense of causal con-
nection between the government's action and the defendant's counter-
action," the Court significantly diminished the applicability of the
exclusionary rule.' 3 The Court refused to examine the police conduct
prior to the point that the defendant in Hodari D. actually was tackled,
and, by so doing, removed many of the facts of the entire incident
from the review of Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards. The
thrust of exclusionary policy has not been a focus on the defendant's
actions, but on police actions, and any test which removes many of
these police actions from review limits the application of the Fourth
Amendment to these acts.
b. Legal Cause and Fourth Amendment Policy
In the past, the Court "acknowledged the requirement for a but-
for causal connection when formulating the independent discovery ex-
102. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445 (1924) and U.S. v. Oswald,
783 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1986) for examples of discussion and application of this aban-
donment/" independent discovery" principle.
103. Ronald J. Bacigal, In Pursuit of the Elusive Fourth Amendment: The Police
Chase Cases, 58 Tenn. L. Rev. 73, 84 (1990).
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ceptions to the exclusionary rule." 1°4 The Court, like any court that has
to apply doctrines of cause (be it for a tort case or for a Fourth
Amendment seizure case), limited the doctrine of "but-for" causation
by the concept of "legal cause"; this "legal cause" being defined as
being the determination of cause that is "not merely fair as between
the parties, but socially advantageous, as serving the most important of
the competing individual and social interests involved. '"' 5 This rather
verbose definition of legal cause can be condensed into the query: "For
what purpose is this cause 'legally recognized'?"'06 This "purpose" is
a shorthand way of expressing public policy, and the pertinent public
policy when discussing the fourth amendment is "protectlion of] indi-
vidual rights of privacy and liberty and ... regulat[ion of) certain forms
of governmental conduct."0'1
In today's conservative, law-and-order-emphasizing society, it is easy
to forget the need for the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
is often seen as a tool for the guilty to escape justice because of some
technicality or some minor police mistake. It is also seen as unnecessary
for law-abiding citizens, since they will never be hauled before a tribunal
on criminal charges. Beliefs like these ignore the possibilities that laws
often change quickly, and that today's law-abiding citizen could be
tomorrow's white-collar criminal. The protections that the Fourth
Amendment gives to actual criminals is incidental, because the Fourth
Amendment's prevailing purpose is to protect the average citizen from
overbearing police activities. Were it not for the Fourth Amendment,
there would be no barrier to such overbearing police activities, and the
average, law-abiding citizen would be imperiled by constant and possibly
even capricious police interference. The Fourth Amendment public policy
of individual protection from police interference is understandably (and
lamentably) forgotten by citizenry concerned with a growing crime wave,
but it is inexcusable when this policy is forgotten by a court in deciding
when the highest level of police interference (a seizure of a person)
occurs.
A court's making determinations of any nature requires not just a
raw analysis of facts, but a weighing of facts against prevailing policy.
This is as applicable in the realm of seizure law as in the realm of tort
104. Id. at 101, citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988)
and Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1983). See also supra note
2.
105. Bacigal, supra note 103, at 101, citing Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U.
Pa. L. Rev. .343, 348 (1924).
106. Bacigal, supra note 103, at 101, citing Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law 776 n.83
(3d ed. 1982).
107. Bacigal, supra note 103, at 101, referring to Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (1974).
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law. Courts deciding Fourth Amendment issues should be able to consider
as much of the police conduct as possible in making the final deter-
mination as to when a seizure occurred. In effect, the Court in Hodari
D. does not trust the reasoning processes of other courts or even of
itself, since it sets out a brightline rule that allows for no factors such
as the Fourth Amendment policy to be read into the test. A court that
focuses on actions as a result of the suspect's choices instead of police
actions as the legal cause for an event has limited this policy since they
have "effectively foreclosed any inquiry into the reasonableness of the
police conduct that motivated the suspect's [actions]"; only when police
action is considered a seizure is an inquiry into any justification in
order.1a" A court's consideration that a suspect's choice (to flee or to
abandon evidence) serves as a "superseding cause"' ' that removes re-
sponsibility from law enforcement officials "forces [a court] to ignore
the catalyst that prompted a suspect's decision to flee [or abandon
evidence)" in the first place."10
A limitation of the doctrine of legal cause to Fourth Amendment
seizures as envisioned by the Hodari D. Court's brightline test would
not "serve the Amendment's purpose of regulating governmental con-
duct.""' It has been suggested that:
It is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's goal of regulating
police misconduct and with elemental notions of fairness to
require that one whose conduct contributes to another's loss
should justify his actions.' When called upon to explain their
role in contributing to a suspect's loss of liberty, the police
should offer the type of substantive justification recognized by
the amendment, e.g., that the chase was prompted by probable
cause, reasonable suspicion, or the like." '
The desirable end of judicial scrutiny of police misconduct can only
happen if the United States Supreme Court "brings the chase within
the coverage of the fourth amendment by broadly interpreting the nature
of the causal link between the police action and the suspect's reaction."",
The dissent in Hodari D. tended to agree with this proposition, claiming
108. Bacigal, supra note 103, at 105.
109. A "superseding" or "intervening" cause in this case would be one that relies
upon an act by the victim to break the chain of causation, a chain that links the act to
police conduct. This breaking of the chain of causation would occur in cases where the
"victim might easily have avoided the harm [and where] it seems just to relieve the
defendant [of responsibility for the damaging conduct]." Edgerton, supra note 105, at
362.
110. Bacigal, supra note 103, at 107.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted).
113. Id.
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that "the character of the citizen's response [to law enforcement conduct]
should not govern the constitutionality of the officer's conduct."", 4 The
dissent drew on Tennessee v. Garner,' in which an unarmed, fleeing
thief was shot dead by a police officer."16 The Court in Garner refused
to hold Garner responsible for the bullet that ended his life, instead
holding the police officer responsible for this excess of force that resulted
in the penultimate seizure of a person, by stopping their motion with
a bullet.' '1 This holding was ignored in Brower and Hodari D., however,
with the Court saying that the consequences of the encounters/chases
were not the responsibility of police actors as in Garner, but were the
products of independent choices by the suspects. In his dissent, Justice
Stevens dismissed the finding that Hodari's tossing of the drug gave
the police the probable cause to seize him without consideration of the
groundless police pursuit that led to the tossing; instead, Stevens sup-
ported a finding that "the constitutionality of a police officer's show
of force should be measured by conditions that exist at the time of the
officer's action," not by what heavy-handed police conduct later turns
up."8 In the case of Hodari D., no constitutional basis for the show
of force, i.e., the chase, existed, and, thus, Stevens would have excluded
the evidence seized as a result." 9
The Court's "double standard" of assigning responsibility in chase
cases as opposed to cases where the officer used force on a suspect has
also perplexed commentators other than this one.2 0 A possible motive
could be that perhaps the Court made a policy decision in Hodari D.
that weighed the individual's right to be let alone against the perceived
urgencies of the crime explosion in America. Perhaps the necessity for
overturning Mendenhall that Justice Stevens found lacking can be found
in American society's desire to win the "War on Drugs" at all costs.' 2'
114. California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (1991). The minority opinion,
authored by Justice White, goes on to outline a "laundry list" of feared police excesses
that will result from the majority's lack of "discouraging improper behavior on their
part" by its failure "to recognize the coercive and intimidating nature of such behavior"
and its creation of "a rule that may allow such behavior to go unchecked." Some of
these possible excesses are: DEA agents approaching passengers in an airport with guns
drawn, use of this intimidation to announce a baggage search, reliance upon the passengers'
reactions (such as flight, discarding of objects, etc.) to "justify" the stop, and police
firing at, but missing, suspects who continue to flee. Remember, it is not a seizure until
they are touched by the bullet, or by the policeman, or if they yield to the Wyatt Earp-
like display of force. Ill S. Ct. at 1552, 1561.
115. 471 U.S. 1. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
116. Id. at 4, 105 S. Ct. at 1697.
117. Id. at 7, 105 S. Ct. at 1699.
118. 111 S. Ct. at 1560.
119. California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (1991).
120. See Bacigal, supra note 103, at 101.
121. See supra note 80.
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Apparently, the majority decided that individual liberties must yield to
the desire that society has for its police to be able to investigate suspects,
especially those peddling drugs. Garner can be distinguished from Hodari
D. as not concerning a problem involving the intricacies of when a
seizure occurred, but one involving the bigger question of police rea-
sonableness in shooting unarmed fleeing suspects. The threat was that
police would have more and more leeway to use deadly force, but, in
Hodari D., the threat that the Court must consider is that the police
will "merely" harass citizens, not kill them. The choice that the Court
makes here is one that society is apparently willing to readily accept:
safe streets over individual rights to be free from police interference.
But this policy choice is not the only consideration that a court should
make when deciding when a seizure has occurred; it should consider
other factors before coming to a conclusion.
c. Police Intent to Seize as a Factor in Determination of the
Moment of Seizure
One of the factors that a court should take into account when
making the decision as to what the legal cause of evidence's abandonment
is exhibited police intent to seize. Conditions surrounding the police/
citizen interaction are helpful in determining if a seizure has occurred.
The dissent in Hodari D. applied Garner's holding to say also that, as
in Garner where the Court evaluated the conditions surrounding the
police officer's actions at the time he decided to seize the suspect, so
should a court look at circumstances surrounding police action in other
seizures. The emphasis should not be just on whether or not the police
action results in a touching or submission-based seizure, but should also
consider the state of mind of the officer. In other words, not only
should the reasonable belief of the suspect that he is not free to leave
be examined, but the subjective intent on the part of the officer should
be examined, as well.
This focus on the state of mind (or intent) of the officer as a factor
in determining if a seizure occurred was mentioned in other opinions
of the Court. In Chesternut, the Court stated that "the subjective intent
of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment
implications of police conduct only to the extent that the intent has
been conveyed."' 2 The Court also pointed out that the subjective intent
of the officers was not to "capture respondent, but to see where he
was going."'' 2 It would appear that if the intent and actions of the
officers are such as to reasonably communicate to a person that he is
122. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 n.7, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 n.7 (1988).
123. Id. at 573 n.6, 108 S. Ct. at 1980 n.6.
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the subject of pursuit, that person would be "seized." This is the case
because chases are "so intimidating that [a person] could [not) reasonably
... believe . . . that he was . . free to disregard the police presence
and go about his business."' '2 4 The majority in Hodari D. apparently
focused not on what a reasonable person would think of a chase, but
what the suspect who ran actually thought; the Court apparently thought
that if the suspect continues to run, he evidently thinks he is "free...
to go about his business" and keep running. What the Court ignored
is that the mere act of flight is insufficient to show a disregard for the
police presence and a maintenance of one's business; if anything, it
shows a conspicuous regard for the police presence to the extent that
the suspect wishes to free himself of it as soon as possible. One could
argue that perhaps the flight is a submission of sorts to police authority,
and that the flight is a sign of recognition of the authority; the suspect
recognizes that the police officer has the authority to arrest him, but
he has no desire to be arrested and flees to avoid the effects of the
authority. The distinction between viewing remaining still as submitting
or running away as another form of submission is too fine for legal
purposes, and, therefore, the chameleon of "submission" should not
be a basis for a court's decision. After all this discussion on the problems
of Hodari D., perhaps it is time that this author tried to point the way
to a solution. In doing this, we will hopefully find the true nature of
the right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
0
d. What Do Precedents Like Mendenhall Protect?
At this point, we must examine what rights are protected by pre-
cedents like Mendenhall. Is it the right to leave? If so, the suspect in
Hodari D. can arguably be said to have exercised that right by departing
from the scene, albeit hurriedly. Could it possibly be the right to be
free from police interference? This author believes that this right to be
free from police interference is the right protected by Mendenhall. The
Fourth Amendment and the decisions that interpret it should have a
broad construction in order to secure as many protections from police
interference as are possible. In Hodari D., the police interfered with
Hodari's right to be on that section of the street, and their pursuit
denied him access to other parts of the street. The police action did
not prevent him from leaving, but it did interfere with his right to "go
about his business," even if the business was selling crack to fellow
teenagers. Granted, one does not have much sympathy for Hodari D.,
but take the following possibility: Tannix is sitting on a park bench
and Jarnaby Bones, a nosy private eye, tells him to get off the bench
124. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 1981.
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so he can stake out a divorcee going into a seedy motel. Tannix angrily
refuses, claiming that he needs the bench for some investigating of his
own. Harsky, a known police officer, tells Tannix to get off the park
bench he is sitting on, with the command being given for no apparent
reason. Tannix sullenly moves in deference to Harsky's command, since,
after all, Harsky is a cop. If a court decided that not being "free to
leave" is the requisite for seizure, Tannix has not been seized, for he
is certainly free to leave. In fact, he was ordered to leave. A court,
however, could focus on the interfering effect that the command had
on Tannix's right to make his own decisions as to where he stays or
goes. Asking Tannix to get up and move without any good reason may
seem to be no real intrusion, but what if it happened again when Tannix
moved to another bench and sat down? If another police officer told
him to move, he still would be free to leave. And if it happened again?
This game of "musical benches" could continue so long as there were
enough willing officers to keep Tannix moving. Such commands would
escape Fourth Amendment reasonableness review if the test for its ap-
plicability was a police interference with the right to leave, a right
repeatedly exercised by Tannix (albeit at the policemen's insistence). The
key is to look at the effect a police action or command has on a
defendant's decisional freedom to be left alone or to decide if he wants
to move or not, and, if there has been an effect without constitutional
basis and with the intent to create such an effect, a court should hold
that a seizure has occurred,' 2' Unfortunately, courts before Hodari D.
were loath to apply this test (as evidenced by Chesternut), and, after
Hodari D., will be even less likely to apply such a test that focuses on
restriction of decisional freedoms.
As mentioned previously, any inquiry should focus on protecting
individual rights by examining exactly what made the suspect produce
the evidence. Although the present United States Supreme Court may
have failed to make this inquiry in such a fashion as to protect individual
rights, other courts, including the Supreme Court of Louisiana, have
not. In its decision of State v. Saia,1zG the Supreme Court of Louisiana
handed down the first and possibly most extreme case on intent as an
ingredient for the starting point of a seizure.
B. Police Intent as an Ingredient of Legal Cause of a Suspect's
Actions in the Louisiana Jurisprudence-State v. Saia
In the landmark case of State v. Saia, the Supreme Court of Louis-
iana was faced with a similar set of circumstances as the United States
125. It is only reasonable for a court to treat conduct as "intentionally creating an
effect" when the officer knows or should know that his approach will produce a submission
to authority, or, alternately, provoke a suspect's flight so as to avoid a physical restriction
on his freedom of movement.
126. 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974).
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Supreme Court encountered in Hodari D.. On August 18, 1972, two
New Orleans patrolmen were driving by a residence known as an outlet
for drugs. The officers saw defendant leave the residence and pulled
up beside her, "at which time she put her hand inside the waistband
of her pants ... and walked back toward [the residence]." 27 The officers
alighted from their car, pursued the walking defendant from behind,
and, as they approached the defendant, saw her pull out two envelopes
of what appeared to be heroin. At this point, the officers grasped Saia's
hand and removed two packets of heroin. At the defendant's trial, she
filed a motion to suppress the evidence as the fruit of a seizure that
lacked any reasonable suspicion and, thus, any constitutional basis.'
In an opinion by then-Justice Dixon, the court conceded that the
police had probable cause to arrest Saia "when the officers saw the
glassine envelope in her hand." 29 However, this was not when the
defendant was seized; the defendant was seized when the "police officers
sprang from their car and overtook the defendant."' 30 According to the
court, the seizure occurred when the police "acted before they saw the
envelope" and since they only saw the envelope when they overtook
her, it followed that they must have "acted" when they initiated the
pursuit. 3 ' The court noted that the officer must have the right "to
approach [the suspect] and by so doing intrude on the person's freedom
of movement."'3 The court said that "[piolice cannot approach citizens
under circumstances that make it seem that some form of detention is
imminent unless they have probable cause to arrest the individual or
reasonable grounds to detain the individual."' 33 The court emphasized
that "the right to be let alone is of the utmost importance in a free
society," and that the mere approach of a police officer so as to
communicate that ',some form of detention is imminent" should be
with good cause since it is a seizure that intrudes upon this right to be
"let alone.'"" This test of seizure is similar to the ones espoused by
the United States Supreme Court in Chesternut 35 in that it examines
police pursuit as a factor in communicating that a person is seized.
However, Saia goes one step further and focuses on when the police
officer decides to act, and evidences this intent to seize by initiating a
pursuit as the brightline beginning point of a seizure, as opposed to
the majority in Hodari D.'s emphasis on when the suspect is brought
127. Id. at 870.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 871.
130. Id. at 873.
131. State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869, 871 (La. 1974).
132. Id. at 873.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 n.7. 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 n.7 (1988).
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to heel. According to the Saia test, "it is only when the citizen is
actually stopped without reasonable cause or when that stop is imminent
that the right to 'be let alone' is violated.""' 6 This holding is even more
extreme than Mendenhall since it says that the suspect is seized when
the seizure is imminent, unlike Mendenhall, which only deals with an
imminent seizure of which the suspect is aware, and, taken in combi-
nation with other factors, would lead him to believe that he is not free
to leave. In Saia, there is no requirement that the suspect even be aware
that the seizure is imminent; the focus being instead upon when police
decide that the suspect is not free to leave. Even if the suspect must
be aware of the impending seizure, the decision clearly endorsed Men-
denhall five years in advance as at least the minimum level of protection
that an individual has for his right to be "let alone."
This holding came to grips with the reality that police approaches
often cause persons to act in a different fashion than they otherwise
would act. Saia realized that officers are aware of this facet of human
nature, and it sought to deter groundless threatening approaches in the
hope of "scaring" evidence up by applying exclusion to them. As the
court said in a later case discussing Saia,"' "[alt the foundation of Saia
is the proposition that police officers may not reap the benefits of their
unlawful intrusion into a citizen's freedom of movement."'", It is clear
that the United States Supreme Court in Hodari D. would take issue
with the test of Saia, claiming that only when the actions bore fruit,
as in a touching of or submission by the suspect, would there be a
seizure. More in line with current United States Supreme Court thinking
was the dissent in Saia by Justice Summers. 19 The dissent asserted that
the seizure did not occur "until the officers actually laid hands upon
the defendant and detained her, announcing that she was arrested. '"'
Justice Summers said that "no invasion of defendant's privacy resulted
when the officers drove up alongside her and then alighted. from their
car to question her.''4 Just as the Court in Hodari D. decided that
the defendant was not seized until touched, so Summers postulated in
Saia. Some of the statements made by Summers in Saia and Scalia in
136. State v. Ryan, 358 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (La. 1978).
137. Ryan, 358 So. 2d 1274.
138. Id. at 1276.
139. State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869, 875 (La. 1974). It is interesting to note that, in
his dissent, Justice Sanders believes that the defendant's evasive maneuvers, coupled with
the area being a high-crime area and defendant's alighting from the "drug outlet," were
enough to give the police probable cause to stop her. It is an interesting coincidence that
many of the same factors existed in Hodari D., and it is another interesting coincidence
that Sanders assigns significant weight to the defendant's flight (like the majority in Hodari
D.). Perhaps Justice Sanders believed that "The wicked flee when no man pursueth."
140. Id. at 877.
141. Id.
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Hodari D. are so parallel as to be almost eerie.14 Both opinions suffer
from a similar flaw in that they both ignore the realities of police/
citizen encounters.
C. The Realities of Seizure
In the Court's majority opinion in Hodari D., the Court pointed
out that a police officer does not give commands expecting to be
ignored."13 The Court was correct in this assessment, but it did not
realize that, in past decisions like Brown, discussed supra,'" it had given
the "green light" to citizens to ignore police commands. Despite this
judicial endorsement of the "right to be let alone," the realities of the
situation are very different. When a policeman commands a person to
stop, he has technically seized that person. If the person decides to
ignore the command, he is sure to become the subject of a physical
touching when the policeman grabs him in anger at his being ignored.
Police have always subjectively decided that a suspect is not free to
leave when they command him to stop. In State v. Grogan,"41 for
example, a suspect attempted to exercise the right to refuse an encounter
with police by running away and was caught and arrested for resisting
an officer." 6 In State v. Shy,' 4 Justice Dennis, commenting upon the
arresting officer's intent not to allow the suspect to break off an en-
counter, noted this reality in a dissenting opinion:
Once the confrontation was forced by the officers, it is fanciful
to suppose that the defendant was free to walk away. The
officers admitted in their testimony that if the defendant had
attempted to leave he would have been stopped by force. If
both officers and the defendant knew that the defendant would
be physically restrained if he had tried to walk away, it is
legalistic, but not realistic, to pretend that an ordinary citizen
would be aware of or believe in, much less rely upon, the
majority's shibboleth, viz., "the mere fact that police approach
a citizen and address him does not compel that citizen to respond
142. Perhaps even more fascinating are conclusions that Justice Summers makes re-
garding "furtive actions and flight" at the approach of law enforcement officers. Id. at
878, citing Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1912 (1968). He notes that these
actions are strong indicia of mens rea, and, like the majority in Hodari D., would give
them great weight in evaluating a police officer's "reasonable suspicion" to seize a suspect.
302 So. 2d at 877.
143. California v. Hodari D., IIl S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
144. See supra note 17.
145. 373 So. 2d 1300 (La. 1979).
146. Id. at 1301.
147. 373 So. 2d 145 (La. 1979).
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to the inquiries or comply with their request; legally, nothing
prevents his choosing not to answer and walking away." It
would be difficult to find in the annals of the law any instance
in which a citizen had successfully exercised this right .... 141
If both the police and citizenry believe that a person is not free to
leave (seized) when an officer calls out to him, it seems that a court,
in view of this reality, should consider that person seized under the
Fourth Amendment. If police know that their commands or actions in
approaching a citizen (so long as no touching or submission is involved)
will cause a citizen to act in a certain way, it defies rationality to allow
this potentially powerful police tactic to escape Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. The Hodari D. Court, however, has pronounced a decision
that does just that.
What Justice Scalia meant when he said that police will not give
commands "expecting to be ignored" was that, in his opinion, police
never give overbearing commands in the hope that they will be disobeyed
by panicky suspects and evidence will appear as a result of that diso-
bedience. For example, police in Justice Scalia's perfect world will never
yell, "stop right where you arel" at suspicious characters on inner-city
streets in the hope of panicking them into abandoning evidence. Justice
Scalia, along with the majority of the Court, forgets the reality that
most street criminals are nervous people with guilty consciences, whose
minds say that when police officers speak to them in this manner, arrest
and an ensuing search are imminent, and that, in their opinion, the
wisest course of action is to abandon incriminating evidence.
Concerns like the ones previously mentioned have eluded the majority
of the United States Supreme Court in Hodari D. Justice Summers
appears to have proven the old adage "today's dissent is tomorrow's
law," and the burning question on everyone's mind is, or at least should
be, in light of Hodari D., is Saia still good law?
V. WHITHER LOUISIANA?
It is a well-accepted premise that "Itlhe traditional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures [created by the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution) is cemented and expanded by"' 49
Article I, section 5 of the Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
148. Id. at 149.
149. Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 La. L. Rev. I, 20 (1974). See also Richard P. Bullock, Comment, The Declaration
of Rights of the Louisiana of 1974: The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties,
51 La. L. Rev. 787 (1991).
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Constitution of 1974.1" The clearest example of this "broadening" of
guarantees is the section on increased standing (anyone "adversely af-
fected"), as opposed to the federal standard of "anyone with a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" that has been violated' that "supports
a desire to go far beyond federal standards." '"12 The Louisiana courts
have not felt limited by the text of the article in granting greater
protections from police intrusion to citizens, nor do they feel obligated
to follow federal precedent in the realm of search and seizure. A clear
example of this was the decision in State v. Hernandez.'"
Hernandez involved a defendant who was arrested as he got out of
his car in his driveway after a DWI chase by police. Despite Hernandez's
post-arrest demands that no one drive his car, police prepared it for
towing by "inspecting" the interior.'14 This "inspection" yielded ma-
rijuana, and the defendant was tried and convicted of possession of
marijuana.'" Any attempt to justify the search under the then-new rule
of New York v. Belton'56 was squelched by the court, which looked
not to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution for
support, but to Article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974.'5 In carving out a new, separate destiny for Louisiana search and
seizure law, the court remarked that:
We, of course, give careful consideration to the United States
Supreme Court interpretations of relevant provisions of the fed-
eral constitution, but we cannot and should not allow those
decisions to replace our independent judgment in construing the
constitution adopted by the people of Louisiana.'5
150. IH88 La. Const. art. 1, § 5 provides:
Right to Privacy
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
151. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
152. Hargrave, supra note 149, at 22.
153. 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
154. Id. at 1383.
155. Id.
156. The "Belton rule" allowed a police officer who has arrested the occupant of a
vehicle to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle "as a contemporaneous incident
of that arrest." Hernandez, 410 So. 2d at 1384. See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981) for a more detailed discussion of this search incident to
arrest.
157. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d at 1385.
158. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982) (emphasis added).
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Referring to Article 1, section 5, the court remarked that:
This constitutional declaration of right is not a duplicate of the
Fourth Amendment or merely coextensive with it; it is one of
the most conspicuous instances in which our citizens have chosen
a higher standard of liberty than that afforded by the jurispru-
dence interpreting the federal constitution.59
Hernandez was not the last time that Louisiana courts refused to
apply "jurisprudence interpreting the federal constitution" that did not
meet with Louisiana approval. State v. Church60 saw a challenge of
the constitutionality of DWI roadblocks on a state level; federally,
roadblocks could have been, and later were, decided to be, reasonable
invasions of privacy."'1 The court held that:
although this ... DWI roadblock may meet federal constitu-
tional standards, . . . [such] seizure[s are] without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause ... and [are] unconstitutional under
Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. '62
With these two precedents behind us, it is easy to see that Louisiana
has the "gumption" to disregard federal precedent, and to scrutinize
police action in the light of the higher standards of the Louisiana
Constitution. Given Louisiana's greater emphasis on the "right to pri-
vacy" (it is specifically enumerated in our text, but must be inferred
to exist from the federal Bill of Rights), the odds are high that Louisiana
courts will do their "duty" as they see it and refuse to honor Hodari
D. as binding precedent in this state. As Justice Watson pointed out
in Church regarding police infringements on the individual's right to
"be let alone":
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their footing in that way, namely: by silent approaches and
159. Id.
160. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989).
161. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979), the Court decided that
seizures are reasonable if a weighing of factors favors their existence, such as the "gravity
of the problem, the degree to which the seizure serves the public concern, and the extent
of the interference with individual liberty." (Cited in State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293,
1295 (La. 1988)). Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990), settled DWI roadblocks'
constitutionality:
In sum, the balance of the state's interests in preventing drunken driving, the
extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and
the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs
in favor of the state program. We therefore hold that it is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.
162. Church, 538 So. 2d at 997-98.
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slight deviations from legal modes of procedure .... It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. 63
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hodari D. allows
for this type of "stealthy encroachment" on individual rights to be "let
alone," all in the name of law and order, and is, in this author's
opinion, a symptom of a society that is willing to trade more and more
of its fundamental rights for a sense of security from the shadow of
crime. The opinion in Hodari D. is evidence of a phenomenon noted
by past citizens of this great land:
It is not strange ... that such an exuberance of enterprise
should cause some individuals to mistake change for progress,
and the invasion of the rights of others for national prowess
and glory.'"
Hopefully, in time, this "exuberance" will not yield to the harsh realities
of a citizenry deprived of its freedom from unwarranted police inter-
ference, but instead, will yield to the calm of rational thinking, and a
return to the reasonable approach of Mendenhall and its progeny. If
not, the Supreme Court of this land may have said "Goodbye To All
That" freedom from aggressive police interference, and "Hello" to an
era of broad, unreviewable police power.
Randolph Alexander Piedrahita
163. Id. at 997, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S. Ct. 524, 535
(1886).
164. M. Fillmore, Third Annual Address, December 6, 1852, as found in Bartlett's
Familiar Quotations 396 (11th ed. 1939).
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